The Increasing Politicisation of Climate Change: What does this mean for the future of climate policy?
The last decade has been one of progress in the popular understanding of the nature and risks of climate change. Between 2015 and 2021, calls for governments around the world to set more ambitious targets in challenging this crisis rose from 43% to 58% (Globescan, 2021). This international pattern is reflected in the UK, where 75% of adults say they are worried about the impact of climate change (Office for National Statistics, 2021). It seemed like we had reached both a popular and political consensus within the UK that climate change was serious and considerable action was needed. The climate sceptic politics that emerged, particularly under Trump in the US, seemed foreign to the British political landscape with both the major political parties agreeing on key climate pledges such as the phasing out of new cars with combustion engines by 2030 and net zero by 2050. Policies adopted by both parties or made more ambitious in Labour’s case, after the 2019 election (Gabbatiss, 2019).
However, especially over the last few years, we are seeing climate change increasingly becoming a more polarised political issue, particularly within the right wing of British politics. Debates over London’s ULEZ scheme showed that parties can gain political traction in campaigns against environmental legislation. Despite appalling national polling figures, with polls putting them at around 25.2% of the vote, the Conservatives would have a shock win in the Uxbridge by-election (Electoral Calculus, 2024 and Pidd et al., 2023). An election won almost entirely off opposition to the ULEZ extension. This sort of result is unlikely to see too much success on a national scale while support for action on climate change remains strong, however, the result is still concerning. Support for change in a general sense is strong, with 69% of Britons in favour of stricter government measures imposing changes on people’s behaviour. (European Investment Bank, 2022) However, when it comes to the specifics of what is involved in that change, support falls off. Support for a tax on meat and dairy products for instance falls to 47% (Poortinga et al., 2023). Recent announcements by the government stating that although they will maintain the pledge to achieve net zero by 2050, they will be pushing back the ban on the sale of new cars with combustion engines from 2030 to 2035, reflect this disparity and an unwillingness of politicians to impose changes on people’s lifestyles (Sunak, 2023).
In order to meet our essential targets, currently net-zero by 2050 and only a 1.5-degree global temperature rise, radical change will need to be made not just to the day-to-day practices of Governments and business but also to individual behaviour. Much of the change over the last ten years has been relatively easy on the individual, largely consisting of an energy transition away from the use of coal to renewables and natural gas. However, as the situation worsens there are going to have to be tough decisions made by governments that in the short term will hit the pockets and lifestyles of individuals if we are to meet our targets.
As we look to the next election, an election that will almost certainly be won by Keir Starmer’s Labour, there needs to be pressure on the incoming government to take bold and potentially unpopular steps. Climate sceptical policies are still almost entirely coming from the right and with Labour predicted to win a majority of around 270 seats, the future of climate policy is hopefully in safer hands (Electoral Calculus, 2024). Despite this, it is still at risk with Labour's U-turn on their £28bn green investment plan of particular concern (Pickard, 2024). The UK’s climate policy is hanging in the balance and if Labour is unwilling to stand up to a political landscape increasingly hostile to changes to climate policy, then the future will not be bright. Labour will almost certainly be better than the Conservatives, however only time will tell if their policies will go far enough.
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